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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper has been to improve the interpretation
and forecasting of individual implied standard deviations for call
options on SP500 futures. By empirically explaining their composition
through time series analysis and cross-sectional time series regression
models, and profitably utilizing this information to identify mispriced
options, we have demonstrated the disadvantages to using individual
option ISD measures. More importantly, our results provide some evi-
dence as to how the Black option pricing model (and relatedly the
Black-Scholes model) might be misspecif ied , or jointly, how the market
might be inefficient.

A. Introduction
The derivation and use of the Implied Standard Deviation (ISD) for
an option as originated by Latane and Rendleman (1976) has become the
state-of-the-art methodology for variance estimation. Yet the fact
that there will exist as many ISD's for an underlying asset as there
are options on it, as well as their observable nonconstant nature, has
attracted considerable attention from practitioner and theoretician
alike.
From the practitioner's point of view the question has been one of
how to use the ISD for determining mispriced options, assuming it repre-
sents the market's estimate of future volatility. For the academician,
the inconsistent cross-sectional and time series nature of the ISD
implies a certain and perhaps significant degree of misspecif ication
within the Black and Scholes (B-S) option pricing model (and relatedly
the Black option pricing model). Neither domain up to this point has
pursued a careful investigation of these two issues in an integrated
manner.
The focus of this paper will be to improve upon the forecast of
the ISD while simultaneously explaining what this variable really sym-
bolizes. From our results we will attempt to draw specific implications
as to how the Black OPM (and relatedly the B-S model) might be misspe-
cif ied.
Although a theoretical push to understand the nonstationary nature
of the ISD has been gaining momentum for some time now, it is only
with the advent of index options and options on index futures in 1983
and 1982 respectively, that an ample amount of option data has existed
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for a more thorough study of cross-sectional effects. This paper uses
1983 and 1984 data for the call option on SP500 index futures to pur-
sue our prescribed objectives.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section B reviews the
Black OPM, the Black-Scholes 0PM, the underlying assumptions, and
related empirical works concerning the viability and use of these
models. Data and methodology are described in Section C. As a basis
for explaining and forecasting the ISD, Section D examines some of the
distributional aspects of individual ISD's.
Section E attempts to fit the ISD data with autoregressive moving
average (ARMA) structures in order to describe their time series
nature, as well as forecast future values. As an additional tool for
understanding the differences between individual ISD series and their
non-constancy over time, separate cross-sectional time series regres-
sion models are developed for each of 1983 and 1984 data sets in
Section F. ISD forecasts from the ARMA models and regression models
are then compared with three naive methods and subsequently evaluated
for accuracy.
To discern which ISD estimate has the greatest monetary value from
a practitioner's point of view, in section G, hedging strategies be-
tween mispriced options and the underlying futures are devised and exe-
cuted for predesignated holdout periods. Finally, in section H, the
implications of our results are expressed from both academician and
practitioner dominions of concern.
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B. Review of Previous Research
The amount of research that has been conducted in relation to
option pricing is substantial. This section seeks to briefly survey
the major studies which form the impetus for our research.
Although this study indirectly involves the Black-Scholes model
(1973), the extensive coverage it receives in the literature would
make a review of its elements somewhat redundant. However, since we
are studying futures call options, and Black's (1976b) model for
pricing and deriving these contingent claims is used, we shall present
his model here:
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where C is the model price for a futures call option at time t, F
is the underlying futures price at time t , E is the exercise price of
the call option, t is the option's remaining time to maturity in terms
2
of a year, r is the continuous risk-free rate annualized, a„ is the
r
instantaneous variance of returns of the underlying futures contract
over the remaining life of the option, and N( * ) is the cumulative nor-
mal density function.
The differences in valuing an option on a futures contract versus
an option on a stock can be seen by contrasting Black's model with the
B-S model. Both models' strengths rely on the initial establishment of
the riskless hedge portfolio between the option, its underlying asset
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and some riskless security. However, Black assumes that there are no
up-front costs for entering into a futures contract as would occur if
one was buying a stock. Thus in the Black model's derivation the
interest term in the d, and d„ components drops out. Additionally,
Black implicitly assumes that the futures price series follows a sub-
martingale, hence the futures price is an unbiased estimation of the
contract's maturity price. It then follows through the derivation
that the left hand portion of equation (1) ends up being discounted
back to the present at the same rate as the exercise price (with the
additional assumption that the option and futures contracts mature on
the same date).
While these two pricing models are by no means identical, the
general uniformity of their assumption and derivations will allow us
to concurrently draw direct implications for the Black model and
related but indirect consequences for the B-S model. In the context
of this paper, we are concerned primarily with the assumptions that
the instantaneous variance rate is proportionally constant over time.
However, this study shall indirectly examine the model assumptions
which assure a frictionless , liquid market to allow the costless for-
mation and continuous adjustment of riskless hedge portfolios. The
costs associated with low levels of volume are significant in option
trading pits, particularly for deep-in and out-of-the money options
and those with a long time to maturity. Evidence of such costs is
exhibited in the wider range of bid-ask prices for these options.
While such a market reality might have some correlation with the
B-S model's poorer pricing performance for such options, a growing
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array of evidence is emerging which points to the observed noncon-
stancy of the volatility parameter as a probable source of misspeci-
fication bias. Moreover, the proportionally constant variance and
frictionless markets together imply that an adequately liquid level of
trading volume exists for each option on a particular security.
Generally, this implicit condition does not hold in the market place.
As a result of these constraining assumptions, the individual risk-
return characteristics between options differing by exercise price
and/or maturity date, along with the particular market climate at hand
may not be sufficiently expressed in the Black or B-S OPM framework.
Empirical tests of the "accuracy" of Black's model are not well
founded in the literature, thus we turn to the abundance of research
that has been generated off of the B-S model.
Although it is well confirmed that the B-S model exhibits biases
in its pricing of deep-in and out-of-the-money options and those with
a very short or very long term to maturity, the direction of bias is
not reported consistently across studies. Black (1976a) found that the
B-S model systematically over-priced options which were deep-in-the-
money and underpriced those being deep-out-of-the-money. However,
MacBeth and Merville (1979) reported an exactly opposite type of
systematic bias. To make matters even more imprecise, Merton (1976)
notes that practitioners often claim that the B-S model underprices
both deep-in and out-of-the-money options. In regards to time to
maturity, it is generally maintained that the B-S model underprices
short-maturity and overprices long-maturity options. But again, the
evidence contains discrepancies
,
particularly when the bias relative
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to both exercise price and maturity are considered. All these authors
conclude that, to some degree, the pricing bias is related to the
volatility parameter which is typically observed not to be propor-
tionally constant over time as specified.
Several more generalized models have been proposed to overcome the
B-S restriction on the volatility parameter. Merton (1976) derived a
model based on a jump-diffusion process for the underlying security,
that allows for discontinuous jumps in price due to unexpected infor-
mation flows, for instance. An earlier formation by Cox (1975) called
the constant elasticity of variance model, incorporates an observed
market phenomenon that the underlying asset variance tends to fall as
the asset price increases (and vice versa) . Geske (1977) has derived
a compound-option formula which considers the firm's equity to be an
option underlying the exchange traded option. An interesting feature
of Geske's model is that in incorporating the effects of a firm's
leverage on its option the model allows for a nonconstant variance
rate. Jarrow and Rudd (1982) focus on the potential effects from
distributional misspecif ication of the underlying return-generating
process. Thus, their model takes into account pricing biases which
might arise due to differences between the second, third and fourth
moments of the assumed and "true" distributions. Although tests of
these models are far from conclusive, the general impression from the
literature is that these models explain the B-S pricing biases better
intuitively than they do empirically. However, extensive testing and
use of these models is somewhat restricted due to the difficulty of
accurately estimating their additional input variables.
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Numerous studies have considered the biasing effects of dividend
payments on the underlying stock which can invoke an early exercise
value. In a recent study, Geske and Roll (1984) found that the
American option variant of the B-S formula can only partially explain
the bias associated with the B-S model in the theoretical value of an
option.
Another route of model enhancement has gone the way of attempting
to improve the estimation of the volatility term required by the B-S
(and Black) models. Since Latane and Rendleman's (1976) development
of the ISD concept, numerous researchers have studied different
weighting schemes in calculating the ISD as well as its uses and
pricing implications. The majority of studies, including Schmalansee
and Trippi (1978) and Chiras and Manaster (1978) devise weighting
schemes which aim at deriving a single weighted ISD from among all the
individual ISD's to input into the B-S model. Whaley (1983) and Sears
and Park (1984) utilized an OLS regression procedure to weight and
segregate ISD's by maturity date. The major finding of Sears and
Park's study, which like our study used option on stock index futures
data, was a "time-to-maturity" effect in the pattern of the weighted
ISD's over time. These authors interpreted their findings in light of
Merton's (1973) OPM with stochastic interest rate, which implies that
a portion of the ISD's composition is the diminishing instantaneous
variance of the riskless security.
All the studies involving ISD estimation point out to one degree
or another that for any day, the individual ISD's for all the options
on a particular asset (stock or futures contract) will all be dif-
ferent, and will change over time. Yet as MacBeth and Merville aptly
note, different exercise prices should not imply differing ISD's since
the ISD pertains to the underlying asset itself and not the exercise
price. In what might be considered a preliminary basis for this
study, MacBeth and Merville relate systematic pricing differences be-
tween market and B-S option prices to the systematic differences that
occur among individual ISD's relative to exercise price and time to
maturity.
Another rather foreshadowing study conducted by Brenner and Galai
(1981) not only found significant divergence between the daily indi-
vidual ISD's and some time series average ISD, but that the distribu-
tions of the average ISD's were not invariant over time. Finally,
Rubenstein (1981) uses individual ISD's to test five alternative option
pricing models versus the B-S formulation, and attempts to explain
observed pricing biases. In particular, Rubenstein noted that the
direction of pricing bias changes over time which could be the influ-
ence of not only a time-varying volatility term, but also stochastic
interest rates and a changing stock market climate.
C . Data and Methodology
Our data for the study of individual option ISD's included only the
use of call options on the SP500 futures which are traded at the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME). We employed daily data gathered from the
Wall Street Journal covering two periods of time; January 28 to June
30, 1983, and from February 29 to June 27, 1984. Studying two dif-
ferent time periods will allow us to discern some notion of ISD
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characteristics and movements over time as well as the effects of
different market climates (1983 data were drawn from a "bullish" con-
text, while the 1984 data came from more of a sideways, perhaps even
"bearish" market). Interest rates on U.S. Treasury Bills (T-bills)
were also gathered from the same source, updated daily, and computed
as the converted equivalent bond yield from an average of the bid and
ask discount rate for the T-bill, also having a maturity closest to
the date of the option.
The calculations of daily ISD's for each quoted SP500 futures
option were achieved using Whaley's method. Our application of this
method differs from Whaley's in an important way, however. We choose
to study individual option ISD's, broken down by maturity and exercise
price. These ISD's are obtained by first choosing an initial estimate,
a , and then using equation (3) to iterate towards the correct value
as follows:
VVV'Vo1 ^. (3)
where
C. = market price of call option j;
C.(a„) = theoretical price of call option i given a = o„
j
a = initialized estimate of the ISD
a. = estimate of the ISD from iteration
3C
-r— a„ = partial derivative of the market price with respect to the
8a '
standard deviation evaluated at o.
In the context of the Black 0PM, the partial with respect to the stan-
dard deviation can be expressed explicitly as:
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The iteration proceeds by reinitializing o to equal a at each suc-
cessive stage until an acceptable tolerance level is attained. We use
the criterion
,V ao,
< .0001
a
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It should be emphasized that a unique feature of our approach is our
determination of "maturity-" and "exercise price-specific" ISD's. We
have disaggregated the option contract data in hopes of extracting
information from ISD's that might otherwise be lost in conglomeration.
The rationale for such a departure is as follows.
Although our discussions with various commodity brokerage houses
indicated that most used some type of weighting scheme for ISD's,
other talks with traders indicated a preference to consider each
option as an individual (derivative) asset. So by utilizing a conglo-
merate or maturity-specific ISD, those options which are not near-the-
money or moderately close to maturity, will appear to be mispriced.
Yet, as other studies have shown, the B-S and Black models do not price
far-in or far-out-of-the-money , or longer term to maturity options
nearly as well as they do the nearer term, near-the-money call
options. As indicated earlier, the assumptions underlying these
models do not allow for market imperfections such as low liquidity and
other various market idiosyncracies . Thus, the use of weighted ISD's
would seem to impute a certain degree of "homogenization" into such
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options. More specifically, the pricing model used in conjunction
with some weighted ISD would not account for such influences as dif-
ferences in the level or consistency of volume on the option's actual
trading price. Accordingly, all of our analysis and interpretation is
focused on the ISD's of maturity- and exercise price-specific SP500
futures options.
D. Distributional Qualities of ISD's
The difficulty in discerning the correct value for the volatility
parameter in the option pricing model is due to its fluctuation over
time, thus complicating the estimate of its future value. Therefore,
since an accurate estimate of this variable is so essential for
correctly pricing an option, it would seem that time-series and cross-
sectional analysis of this variable would be as important as the con-
ventional study of security price movements. Moreover, by examining
individual ISD's over time as well as within different time sets, the
unique relationships between the underlying stochastic process and the
pricing influences of differing exercise prices, maturity dates and
market sentiment (and indirectly, volume), might be revealed in a way
that could be modeled more efficiently. This section will examine the
distributional qualities of ISD's as a prelude to our more quantita-
tively powerful ARMA and cross-sectional time series regression
modeling in the next sections.
A summary of individual ISD distributional statistics for SP500
futures call options from '83 and '84 appears in Table 1. The most
observable feature from this table is the significantly different mean
values of ISD's that occur for different exercise prices. Looking at
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the means for the '83 ISD's, the average size and variability of the
ISD appear to be inversely related to the size of the exercise price.
Such a relationship could be related to volume in that deep-in-the-money
options are traded less due to their larger relative cost, as well as
their greater risk of being exercised (to those who sell them). More-
over, we might posit that a higher level of trading volume would be
associated with a tighter bid-ask price spread in the pits, and conse-
quently, a lower volatility of prices as might be reflected in the ISD's
More conclusive evidence of the relationship of ISD's to exercise price
will arise from the results of the cross-sectional time series regres-
sion in the next section.
Comparing the mean ISD's across time periods, it is quite evident
that the 1984 ISD's are significantly smaller. This decline in the
size of the average ISD could very well be related to the change in
Insert Table 1 about here
market climates between 1983 and 1984. Also noticeable is an alteration
in the inverse relationship between the mean size of the ISD and exer-
cise price, as observed for the '83 data. Although the June options
still tend to follow this same pattern to a smaller degree, the September
options display ISD's which decline from the high and low exercise prices
towards a low value for the at-the-money option. Such a pattern for
these intermediate term options might be reflective of a larger concen-
tration of trading volume for the at-the-money option, perhaps due to
indistinct market sentiment. We can also tentatively identify a time-
to-maturity effect as was observed by Park and Sears (1984), with the
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Septeraber options possessing higher mean ISD's than those maturing in
June. Once again, stronger support for this effect on the ISD's will
be displayed in the regression results.
While it is not empirically conceivable at this point to draw
conclusions concerning the size and variability of the ISD and their
relationship to trading volume and market sentiment, Tables 2a and
2b do provide some intuitive fortitude to these conjectures. These
tables show typical price and volume data on a single day for the SP500
futures options in '83 and '84. As can be easily seen, the concentra-
tion of volume correlates very well (negatively) with the size and
variability of the ISD's. Moreover, while the highly bullish '83
market shows higher volume at higher exercise prices, the rather un-
clear, somewhat bearish market in the spring of '84 indicates signifi-
cantly more trading concentration around lower exercise prices
(160-165).
Insert Tables 2a and 2b about here
The other statistical measures listed in Table 1 are the relative
skewness and relative kurtosis of the ISD series, along with the stu-
dentized range. Skewness measures lopsidedness in the distribution and
might be considered indicative of a series of large outliers at some
point in the time series of the ISD's. Kurtosis measures the peaked-
ness of the distribution relative to the normal and has been found to
affect the stability of variance (Lee and Wu, 1984). The studentized
range gives an overall indication as to whether the measured degrees
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of skewness and kurtosis have significantly deviated from the levels
implied by a normality assumption for the ISD series.
Although we prefer to postpone any interpretation of the effects of
skewness and kurtosis on the ISD series until the regression results,
a few general observations are warranted at this point. For instance,
the '83 statistics suggest that the individual ISD series approximated
a normal distribution. However, the '84-related statistics present a
very different view of this, certainly challenging any assumptions con-
cerning normality. Using significance tests on the results of Table 1
in accordance with Snedecor and Cochran (1967), the 1984 skewness and
kurtosis measures indicate a higher proportion of statistical signif-
icance, although not clearly more than that which occurred among the
1983 measures. At this point we can only surmise that the contrast of
statistics would be related primarily to effective changes in the
market climate.
As a final point to this brief examination of the ISD skewness and
kurtosis, we note the statistics for the 1983 June 150 contract. The
relative size of this contract's skewness and kurtosis measures
reflect the high degree of instability that its ISD exhibited during
the last ten days of the contract's life. Such instability is con-
sistent across contracts. However, we have allowed these distortions
to remain in the computed skewness and kurtosis measures only for this
particular contract to emphasize how a few large outliers can magnify
the size of these statistics. Thus, while still of interest, any
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skewness and kurtosis measures must be calculated and interpreted with
caution.
E . Time Series Analysis of Implied Standard Deviations
The time series model building techniques we use are stemmed in
large part from Box and Jenkins (1970) who proposed a three stage
iterative procedure of identifying, estimating, and checking models
describing particular generating processes. These models are of the
form
t 1 t-1 p t-p t 1 t-1 q t-q
where x is an observation from a covariance stationary series meaning
that
X = cov(x x ) (6)
t t t-r
is independent of t for all t. If stationarity conditions are not
satisfied, they can typically be induced by redefining the x ' s to be
the first differences between successive observations. The $ and 9
terms represent the autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) coeffi-
cients and e is white noise. A large body of evidence is accumulating
which supports the Box-Jenkins methodology, especially in cases of
single series with moderate to large numbers of sample observations.
If any stage of the iterative process falls short of being
incontrovertibly clear, it is the initial one. The theoretical rela-
tionships between autoregressive moving average structures and con-
comitant autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations are often
useful in selecting a model that adequately describes a sample data
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set, yet detecting these theoretical patterns in practice can rightly
be considered more of an art than a science.
A recently developed technique motivated by Hannan and Rissanen
(1982) seems to provide a good practical basis for model selection.
The process involves two stages of computation. The purpose of the
first stage is to obtain estimates of the innovation errors of the ARMA
model. This is accomplished by running successively higher order auto-
regressive models and using the AIC of Akaike (1969) to determine the
optimal order from among them. The innovation errors are estimated by
K = x t " Vt-i - • • • - \Vk (7)
where k is the optimal autoregressive order suggested by the AIC. The
second stage involves fitting all different combinations of ARMA(p,q)
models where, instead of using full maximum likelihood estimation, the
innovation errors estimated in stage one are used as the regressors
upon which the moving average parameter estimates are based. This
allows us to use least squares, thereby saving copious quantities of
computer dollars. These different ARMA(p,q) models (p < 5, q < 5 have
been used) are then compared using the BIG of Akaike (1977) and
Schwarz (1978) and the appropriate model is chosen on that basis.
This procedure comes with no guarantees of consistently being able to
determine "correct" model structures, yet it has been very valuable,
when used in conjunction with sample autocorrelations and partial
autocorrelations, in providing good first guesses.
Once the values of p and q are chosen in the initial stage, the
parameters are estimated. A simulation study conducted by Ansley and
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Newbold (1980) has found that exact maximum likelihood estimation out-
performs least squares when the series are of moderate size and moving
average terms are involved. An approximation to the full maximum like-
lihood function has been derived by Hillmer and Tiao (1979) and is the
basis for the estimation program put forth by Tiao, et al . (1979) that
we use.
Our fitted models are then subject to a series of diagnostic
checks to ensure that the initially specified structures are indeed
adequate. These checks may be viewed as either tests against alter-
native specifications involving additional AR or MA terms or tests
based on the residual autocorrelations from the fitted models. See
Newbold (1984) for details of these test statistics. If these tests
fail to support the initially specified ARMA structures, we would
begin again at the model identification stage, with more elaborate
ARMA structures to consider.
We examined the sample autocorrelations of each of the ISD series
and they tended to die out quickly enough over successive lags that the
stationarity assumption appears to be satisfied without first differenc-
ing. The series were then modelled in the manner just described. After
satisfactory models were obtained, it remained to find the best use for
the information afforded us by the parameter estimates. Certainly the
more predictable future ISD's are the more profitable ones hedged trading
strategies become. In order to test the accuracy of the ARMA forecasts,
we calculated the mean squared forecast errors of one-day-ahead fore-
casts for holdout periods of different lengths and compared them with
the mean squared forecast errors obtained by using previous period
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ISD's, 5-day moving averages, and 5-day exponential moving averages.
We also compare these forecasts with those derived from the regression
model developed in the next section. The holdout periods range from
five to 20 days to indicate how different predictors perform over dif-
ferent forecast periods. Some of the data sets were not tested over
the longer 10 or 20 day holdout periods because there were too few
observations in the series to do so.
As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, there is no one clearly superior fore-
casting method. This may be a bit perplexing since three of the
alternatives to the ARMA forecasts that we consider are actually very
specific cases of ARMA models themselves where the structural and
quantitative relationships of the time series with their forecasts are
predetermined. In contrast, the efficiently specified and estimated
ARMA models are chosen on the basis of the data and would therefore be
expected to better project particular data generating processes into
the future. The best explanation for the poorer than expected ARMA
performance is that our forecast periods, at times, exhibit structural
change or even a sudden trend in ISD's. Non-stationarity (trend beha-
vior) was not observed in the estimation period and hence the ARMA
coefficients that were derived for that time could not predict any
stationarity in the holdout period. Some of the other, "naive" fore-
castors are more responsive to these sudden movements. They do not
have as much of a tendency to pull their forecasts toward middle
ground as ARMA models do. For example, the most naive forecast
(ISD . - ISD ) will be better than some ordinarily superior ARMA
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forecast (e.g., ISD ,, = a + b ISD ) in times of unanticipated non-
s tationarity.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
To tie together some of the results we have identified thus far,
we point out an interesting relationship that arises from an examina-
tion of the MSFE's from the ARMA forecasts (Tables 3 and 4) and the
standard deviations of the ISD series (Table 1). While not precise,
it is apparent that the accuracy of the ARMA forecasts correlates with
the variability of the ISD series. Hence, the more volatile the ISD,
the more difficult it is to forecast.
We realize that this observation might be obvious yet we suggest a
further implication. For instance, one could find such information
valuable in deciding which particular options might be mispriced based
on the use of the OPM and some forecast of the ISD. For instance, if
one calculates that both the September 155 and the September 165 call
options are underpriced, with a significantly lower standard deviation
of the ISD for the 165 call, one might feel justified in putting more
merit behind the latter being mispriced.
F. Regression Model
A significant amount of information has been shown to exist in a
time series of ISD's. The ARMA models used to describe the generating
processes of the ISD series we have examined are all clearly preferred
to random walk, or "white noise" alternatives. These ARMA models do not
give the final word on the subject of ISD forecasting, however. There
are several cross-contract effects that may exist which, if isolated
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properly, will provide further predictive power. In addition, the ARMA
models have not fully captured several time effects. To learn more
about these different influences, we formulated a large cross-section
time series predictive regression model and ran it on the 1983 data and
again on the 1984 data. The regression model is
yit
= B + Vlit-l + 3 2*2it-l + • ' ' + 8i4Xl4it-l + £ it (8)
where
y. = ISD of the i contract at time t
it
x,
. , optimal time series predictor of i contract for time tlit-1
(based on information known at time t-1)
X.
. ,
= time to maturity
2it-l
x- . = (futures price - exercise price)/(exercise price) if > 0,
if not
x
A-it--i
= (exercise price - futures price)/(exercise price) if > 0,
if not
x = standard deviation of the ISD based on previous 5 observa-
tions
x,
. .
= standard deviation of the ISD based on previous 20 observa-6it-l r
tions
x
7
. ,
= skewness of ISD distribution over the previous 20 observa-
tions
x o • _ i
= kurtosis of ISD distribution over the previous 20 observa-8it-l v
tions
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xQ . ,
= standard deviation of continuous futures returns using
previous 5 observations
x „. . ™ standard deviation of continuous futures returns usingI0it-1 ft
previous 20 observations
x - - = dummy variable; 1 if Tuesday, if not
x,„. - = dummy variable; 1 if Wednesday, if notl2it-l
x
_.
_.
= dummy variable; 1 if Thursday, if not
x... . = dummy variable; 1 if Friday, if not
The optimal time series predictors are included in an attempt to
educe information contained in the past. This variable is likely to
capture large portions of the expected cross-contract effects since
the market influences pertaining to a particular contract today are
not likely to have changed considerably since the prior trading day.
The resulting ISD's tend to evolve over time with a strong sense of
heritage.
The time-to-maturity variable was included because, as was indi-
cated by Sears and Park (1984), there tends to be a certain point close
to maturity where the ISD's begin to decrease. Of course, any general
downward trend in ISD's would be partially accounted for by the ARMA
predictors, but it may still be the case that there is a partial
influence that time-to-maturity exhibits.
The third and fourth independent variables have been included to
see if deep-in-the-money options and f ar-out-of-the-money options tend
toward higher or lower than expected ISD's. Previous studies have had
conflicting answers to this important question, according to Jarrow and
Rudd (1983).
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The next two independent variables are included to determine whether
or not the standard deviations of the ISD's have any positive or nega-
tive effect on the ISD's themselves. The third and fourth moments of
the distribution of 20 previous ISD's were also included in the regres-
sion equation to see what, if any, influence they have in determining
current ISD's.
The two measures of the standard deviations of continuous futures
returns are of great interest as regressors since these have tradi-
tionally been approximations of the variable used in the B-S model to
determine the theoretical option price. One would hope to find a
strong relationship between the two volatility measures; the one based
on historical deviations and the one implied by the observed option
price. It may be the case, however, that the implied standard
deviation encompasses more than just the expected future standard
deviation of the underlying asset's return. All B-S model misspecifi-
cations are represented in the ISD term, which may amount to quite a
large distortion. A low correlation between these historical and
implied variables would indicate either that the model misspecif ica-
tions manifesting themselves in the ISD terms are significant or that
the historical standard deviation measure is a poor proxy for the
expected future standard deviation, or both.
The final four explanatory variables are day-of-the-week dummies
which are intended to see if certain days give rise to higher ISD's
than others. For example, certain economic announcements are regularly
made on particular days of the week and this may have a day-of-the-week
effect on ISD's. Note that we include only four dummy variables to
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describe the five days of the week in order to avoid perfect multi-
collinearity with the constant term.
Determining the correct form of a model using pooled cross-section
and time series data is an important, though often troublesome task.
The difficulty arises because the error term may consist of time-series-
related disturbances, cross-section disturbances, or both. The regres-
sion equation we have defined with the optimal time series predictor
in the design matrix, gives us confidence that any possibility of
autocorrelation in the time series disturbances has been mitigated.
There remains the chance that contemporaneous correlation of distur-
bances across contracts exists. However, we feel a majority of this
cross-contract relationship will be accounted for by the in-the-money
and out-of-the-money variables. These are akin to the cross-section
dummy variables of the so-called covariance model. The only real dif-
ference between the two sets of variables is that the estimated dummy
coefficients can take on any values whereas our in-the-money and out-
of-the-money variables implicitly assume that a linear relationship
exists between a contract's exercise price above the underlying asset
price and its ISD and between a contract's exercise price below the
underlying asset price and its ISD. If this posited linear rela-
tionship does exist, then cross-contract disturbances should not be
highly correlated. The proper estimation procedure, given our assumed
error structure:
N
e.
fc
~ (0, a I ) i=l,2,...,N t=l,2,...,T. m = XT,it em 1 l
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is ordinary least squares. Of course, we will need to check the resi-
duals for possible violations of our assumptions before placing con-
fidence in the sample results.
The regression results are given in Table 5. The optimal time
series predictors were significant, which should come as no surprise
—
ISD's depend on past ISD's. The fact that other regressors were found
to be significant indicates that not all of the variation in ISD's is
explained by the past, though. Time-to-maturity has its predicted
positive effect. The closer an option is to expiration, the lower the
ISD. Both the in-the-money and out-of-the-money effects are signifi-
cantly positive. This result supports the findings of Merton (1976)
who showed that large deviations from the strike price tend to bias
the B-S theoretical price downward. It is logical to expect the ISD's
of the more thinly traded in-the-money and out-of-the-money contracts
to be higher because the writer of these calls runs a greater risk of
Insert Table 5 about here
being stuck in his position. To compensate for the added risk, the
seller would gross up the price thus making the ISD's for these
contracts higher. Individual contract volume data would surely serve
to verify this assertion. (See, as an example of volume by contract,
Tables 2a and 2b)
.
The coefficients on the standard deviation of the ISD variables
give mixed signals, if they can be considered signals at all. This
result is not terribly disappointing since there were no strong a
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priori notions of the effect of ISD variability on the ISD level,
anyway.
The skewness term has a negative effect in the 1984 model and the
kurtosis term has a positive effect in the 1983 model. These results
are difficult to interpret, especially given that the effects are not
consistently significant over the two sample periods. A conceivable
cause of this muddled picture is the unaccountable temporal ordering
of the more influential observations shaping the distribution. For
example, if several outliers have been observed to skew a distribu-
tion, the predictive signal this information might provide would
depend on whether these outliers were observed recently or in the more
distant past. Perhaps what can be said about the negative relation-
ship between skewness and predicted ISD's is that there is a tendency
to discount the influence of the outliers bringing about the skewness,
especially when the outliers comprise the optimal time series predictor,
Discounting the influence of the skew results in predictions closer to
the mean of the ISD distribution—a reasonable direction to go if you
believe such a market correction mechanism exists.
The coefficients on the standard deviation of continuous futures
returns variables switch signs going from the 5-day measure to the
20-day measure. This is likely an artifact of collinearity between
the two measures rather than any genuine partial effect on ISD.
Interestingly, separate regressions of the ISD on the 5-day return
standard deviation alone and on the 20-day return standard deviation
alone indicate very low correlations. These particular regression
results serve to underscore the nature of the implied standard
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deviation. The ISD not only reflects the market's assessment of the
future instantaneous standard deviation but also the market's
deviation from the functional specification of the OPM. Therefore,
its relationship to historical standard deviations may not be strong.
The day-of-the-week dummies indicate a small Friday effect where
the ISD's are slightly higher. This may be related to the fact that
certain economic announcements are made on Thursdays (e.g. , money
supply figures) that will alter the market perception of asset price
volatility. The Friday effect might also be related to option market
inactivity the day before the weekend. Further study may illuminate
this apparent day-of-the-week effect, explaining why Friday's market
may be out of line with that of other days.
A visual inspection of the residual terms has confirmed the
underlying assumptions mentioned earlier concerning the error struc-
ture of this model. There is no apparent serial correlation or con-
temporaneous correlation so our seemingly insouciant attitude toward
more complicated GLS model structures is justifiable.
Whether the estimated models change significantly over time is an
important question. The parameter estimates obtained for this cross-
section time series model did change significantly from the 1983
sample period to the 198A sample period. A Chow test statistic indi-
cating structural change was obtained for the 1983 and 1984 regres-
2
sions and was calculated to be 2.30. This value exceeds the table
value of 2.04 for an F random variable at the 99 percent level. It
would therefore be wise for the practitioner to update parameter esti-
mates periodically. Perhaps the use of switching regressions would
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prove worthwhile in determining the points at which the structural
changes occur. The switch points could very likely correspond to
changes in market sentiment. The observed structural change going
from our 1983 sample period (bullish market) to our 1984 sample period
(mixed, more downward looking market) may be evidence of a prominent
market sentiment effect, though no explicit tie is necessarily
implied.
G. Trading Rules—Comparative Results & Implications [Ex-Post Test]
In the previous section, our various estimates (ARMA and regression)
for the "true-future" underlying ISD were compared to a number of naive
methods and evaluated through the conventional measure of forecast
accuracy, the MSFE. Now we propose to test the practical (monetary)
value of our ISD estimates versus more naive methods, to determine
which might be superior from a trader's point of concern. In addi-
tion, we hope that these results will further support the theoretical
and practical superiority of using individual ISD estimates versus
some weighted-ISD measure.
Our discussions with traders of SP500 futures options along with
various segments of the brokerage industry yielded a general view of
how ISD's are utilized in practice. The common methods that emerged
were to look at yesterday's weighted ISD (though some sources indicated
that they looked at individual ISD's), or some type of moving average
scheme of past ISD's as being the true-future underlying volatility to
use in the Black OPM. Changes in the option's price due to deviations
in the current ISD from the estimates of the true-future ISD are thus
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deeraed as mispricings by the market. Our trading rule tests utilized
six different estimates for the volatility parameter which were:
(1) a 5-day exponentially-weighted average of the ISD
(2) a 5-day equally-weighted moving average of the ISD
(3) 1-day ahead ARMA forecasts of the ISD
(4) a 1-day lag of the actual ISD for the option
(5) 1-day ahead regression forecasts of the ISD
(6) a simple-constant mean value for the ISD, representative
of the near-the-money , nearer term (high volume) option.
The trading rule that we will use is simply to buy underpriced and
sell overpriced options, while taking an opposite position in the under-
lying futures contract according to the hedge ratio (computed using the
estimated ISD). Mispricings will be identified by comparing the closing
market price for an option with the Black OPM price using one of the
seven ISD estimates. The holdout periods for each option are the same
as those from the last section, ranging from eight to twenty actual
trading days. In each transaction ten options were bought or sold (and
lOx the hedge ratio of futures were sold or bought, respectively), in
order to magnify the mispricings as might be seen from the eyes of a
trader, as well as to make the correct hedge ratio more realistically
attainable. Positions are closed out (on the basis of closing prices)
once the mispricing diminishes to a predetermined minimum level. If
the mispricing has reversed itself and is of a great enough significance,
the position is assumed to be reversed on the same day that it is closed
out. While a number of trading rules were tested, the one we used for
the results of this paper is summarized in Table 6.
-29-
Insert Table 6 about here
In order to ascribe as much realism as possible to these tests, we
considered the following market trading costs. Commission costs per
transaction of $20 were determined by using the rates publicly offered
by a discount futures broker. These costs were calculated as follows:
n
E($20 x 10) : cost of option position
n
+E($20 x 10 x hedge ratio): cost of future position
Total Commission Costs
n = the total number of times a position was opened.
Although a portion of the margin required of a trader enter into a
futures position can be put up in the form of interestearning T-bills,
a substantial portion required for maintaining the margin account by
the clearinghouse must be strictly in cash (even for a hedge or spread
position). Consequently, there is a real interest cost involved, for
which we will further reduce gross trading income:
n
Margin Interest Costs = E(RMM x NF. x i x x.
)
where: RMM = required maintenance margin; NF . = number of futures
contracts entered into; i = interest cost (assumed to be 10.0%); T. =
length of futures position in annual terms; and n = total number of
times a futures position was entered.
Some other very real and significant market costs are those asso-
ciated with liquidity and timing. Options which are deep-in-the-money
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for instance, are not heavily traded and therefore present additional
costs for actually getting into or out of a position. Since the last
reported price for the option may not have occurred at the same time
as that for the underlying future, there always arises a problem with
using closing prices. Furthermore, there is little assurance that one
could buy or sell these contracts and expect to receive the closing
prices reported in the paper when the market reopens the next morning.
To approximate such market costs we first penalize ourselves each time
we enter and exit a futures position by "one tick" (equal to a price
change of .05 = $25)
:
n
Futures Liquidity Costs = E($50 x NF.)
where: $50 = (2 x .05 x $500), the market value of two price ticks;
NF. = number of futures entered in any one trade; and n = number of
times a futures position was entered.
More severe liquidity (and timing) costs were calculated and deducted
for each option transaction:
n
Option Liquidity = £[$5000 x (NEPA x .1 + NMMO x .1)]
Costs
where: $5000 = 10, (number of options bought or sold) x $500 (the
market value multiplier for the option premium); NEPA = number of
exercise prices (in increments of $5) away from being at-the-money;
NMMO = number of maturity months out; and 0.10 = correspondingly
liquidity cost, (two price ticks).
The results of our tests are summarized in Tables 7 through 9.
Tables la and 7b summarize the cumulative trading results for all
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options studied in a particular year, by which ISD estimate was used
in the calculation of the model price. For both years, the forecast
from the regression model proved to be superior overall. This outcome
lends support to the advantage of considering the direct effects of
differing exercise prices when trying to predict the ISD for an
option.
The regression model utilized some of the insights of time series
analysis as would be impounded in the optimal time series predictors.
Also, this cross-sectional time series regression model took into
account the historical 20-day standard deviation of the continuous
return for the underlying futures contract, the short-term variability
and skewness and kurtosis of the ISD (indirect effects of exercise
price and perhaps market sentiment), the time-to-maturity, and the day
of the week.
We might also note that nearly any method would have made money in
'83, while '84 was certainly a less volatile market with little trend,
and consequently was more difficult to profit in. The ARMA forecasts
did quite well overall as did the straight moving average (surprisingly),
while the exponential moving average performed particularly well in
1983.
Though certainly not conclusive or even completely realistic, these
results do point to the additional and useful information which is im-
pounded in the individual ISD's which would have been lost by aggregat-
ing them. That such information is available to potentially profit
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from, suggests that either the market is inefficient and/or the Black
OPM is raisspecif ied (and perhaps correspondingly the B-S 0PM).
Insert Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here
H. Summary & Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to improve the interpretation
and forecasting of individual implied standard deviations for call
options on SP500 futures. By empirically explaining their composition
through time series analysis and cross-sectional time series regression
models, and profitably utilizing this information to identify mispriced
options, we have demonstrated the disadvantages to using individual
option ISD measures. More importantly, our results provide some evi-
dence as to how the Black option pricing model (and relatedly the
Black-Scholes model) might be misspecif ied, or jointly, how the market
might be inefficient. Though the original model implicitly assumes a
frictionless market and a constant volatility term, market realities
along with past studies would not be able to substantiate these types
of assumptions. Moreover, the indirect effects of volume as exhibited
through differences in exercise price, time to maturity, and even
market sentiment over time, are verified by these results as being of
consequence for the "true" valuation process of an option. Yet, the
Black OPM takes no explicit account of such market imperfections and
subjectivities. The misspecified aspects of the model appear to get
"dumped" into the ISD variable, empowering it to represent something
more than just a measure of volatility for the underlying asset
-33-
returns. This paper has found that the underlying generating process
for the ISD is forecastable , therefore it is conceivable to base
trading rules on the informational content of this variable alone.
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FOOTNOTES
The first, most naive predictor considered is the ISD from the
previous period. It is simply an AR(1) process of the form ISD t =
+ 1 * ISD t_2. The 5-day moving average predictor can be expressed
as an AR(5) model of the form ISD t = + .2 ' ISD^j + .2 * ISD t_ 2 +
... + .2 * ISD t _5^ The approximate 5-day exponential moving average
we used is another special case of the general AR(5) model where the
parameters are restricted as follows: ISD t = + 16/31 * ISD t_i +
8/31 * ISD t_ 2 + V31 * ISD t_ 3 + 2/31 • ISD t _ 4 + 1/31 ISD t_ 5 .
2„u „
(e
*
e*"6 ' e)/a (.004370-. 004075)/15
'Chow test: F
q,n-k ' e'e/(n-k) .004075/(507-30)
e^e
;V
is restricted SSE
e'e is unrestricted SSE
a is number of restrictions
K is number of regression coefficients estimated in unrestricted
regression
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTIONAL STATISTICS FOR INDIVIDUAL ISD'S
Coeffi-
cient
of Student-
Option Std. Varia- Kur- ized
Series Mean Dev. tion Skewness tosis Range Obs
1983
" #June 150 .20282 .04511 .222 4.860* 27.274 7.766* 95
June 165 .15416 .01963 .127 -.205 .180 4.774 70
Sept. 145 .19839 .02438 .123 .292 -.308 4.782 106
Sept. 150 .18334 .02161 .118 -.284 .427 5.375 106
Sept. 160 .17452 .01454 .083 -.484* -.209 4.874 86
Sept. 165 .16372 .01468 .090 -.451* -.283 4.777 64
Sept. 170 .15794 .01104 .070 .612* -.299 3.999 44
Dec. 165 .15789 .02087 .132 -.864* .397 4.496 53
1984
June 150 .13168 .00781 .059 -.762* 1.435* 5.383** 52
June 155 .12490 .00629 .050 .189 -.767* 4.071** 50
June 160 .11944 .00630 .053 .116 -1.280* 3.465** 50
June 165 .11865 .00536 .045 -.175 .787* 3.740** 47
Sept. 160 .12938 .00452 .035 -.159 -.095 4.871 57
Sept. 165 .12876 .00510 .040 .843* 1.501* 5.323** 62
Sept. 170 .12910 .00570 .044 .384* .047 4.426 62
//data contained large outliers which occurred as the option moved very
near to expiration.
indicates that the statistic is significant at the 95 percent level of
confidence
.
**indicates that the statistic is significant at the 95 percent level
of significance.
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3.85 0.4C
FOTAL S & P 500 CALL OPTIONS: 1132 152U + 242
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Table 3
Mean Squared Forecast Errors for Different Predictors of ISD
Forecasting method used
5-day 5-day
Holdout Previous moving exponential
Series Period ISD avg. moving avg. ARMA Regression
June 150 (83)
June 165 (83)
Sept 145 (83)
5 .205 377 .264 .198 .298
10 .213 413 .268 .226 .335
5 .034 081 .046 .049 .046
10 .085 067 .060 .092 .069
5 1.727 626 .901 1.039 .837
10 .963 529 .592 .614 .463
20 .541 428 .373 .509 .384
5 .733 669 .833 .818 .742
10 .477 456 .524 .535 .495
20 .700 589 .424 .440 .373
5 .119 075 .074 .203 .162
10 .139 079 .087 .187 .163
20 .101 130 .094 .128 .103
5 .056 200 .107 .017 .171
10 .035 123 .063 .018 .073
Sept 150 (83)
Sept 160 (83)
Sept 165 (83)
Sept 170 (83) 5 .023 025 .016 .012 .009
Dec 165 (83) 5 1.255 770 .741 .945 .738
10 .770 600 .545 .592 .456
(MSFE's given in the table are scaled by a factor of 10 )
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Table 4
Mean Squared Forecast Errors for Different Predictors of ISD
Forecasting method used
Series
5-day 5-day
Holdout Previous moving exponential
Period ISD avg. moving avg. ARMA Regression
June 150 (84)
June 155 (84)
June 160 (84)
June 165 (84)
Sept 160 (84)
Sept 165 (84)
Sept 170 (84)
5 .029 .036 .029 .024 .027
5 .048 .110 .066 .087 .147
5 .000 .001 .000 .001 .001
10 .005 .008 .006 .006 .006
5 .041 .026 .026 .026 .026
10 .063 .037 .033 .031 .031
5 .005 .015 .009 .021 .015
10 .005 .018 .010 .023 .026
20 .014 .029 .019 .031 .032
5 .007 .007 .006 .004 .010
10 .011 .016 .013 .010 .016
20 .010 .018 .013 .010 .011
5 .014 .010 .010 .015 .025
10 .017 .014 .014 .015 .019
20 .014 .011 .011 .012 .016
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Variable
Optimal time series predictor
Time to maturity
Proportion in-the-money
Proportion out-of-the-money
a
ISD ,
5 obs.
a , 20 obs.
ISD*
Skewness
Kurtosis
a ,5 obs.
return
return, 20 obs.
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
«
2
2
Adj . R
S
Table 5
.egression Results
1983 1984
.698 .195
(8.35)*** (2.94)***
.00029 .00081
(1.36) (7.58)***
.0351 .0450
(4.11)*** (6.89)***
.0105 .00778
(0.56) (1.81)*
-.199 .454
(-0.90) (2.47)***
-.502 -.262
(-1.51) (-1.05)
-.00025 -.00029
(-0.43) (-2.06)**
.00054 -.00003
(1.87)* (-0.55)
-.214 .150
(-1.74)* (4.46)***
.689 -.246
(2.89)*** (-2.20)**
.00037 -.00004
(0.44) (-0.16)
.00071 .00008
(0.84) (0.34)
.00016 -.00013
(0.19) (-0.57)
.00146 .00027
(1.74)* (1.13)
.642 .679
.619 .661
.00397 .00119
(Figures in parentheses are t-statistics)
.
*Indicates significance at 90 percent level.
**Indicates significance at 95 percent level.
***Indicates significance at 99 percent level.
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Table 6
Summary of Trading Rule Used to Form Neutral Hedge Portfolios
Min. Amt. of Max. Amt. of
Mispricing Mispricing
Required Allowed
to Open Before Closing
Classification of the Option a Po sit ion a Position
(Futures price - exercise price) > $10
(Futures price - exercise price) > $5 < $10
(Futures price - exercise price) > $1 < $5
(Futures price - exercise price) > $.2 < $1
.35 .05
.30 .05
.25 .025
.20 .025
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Table 7
Cumulative Survey of Trading Results
a) 1983
*ISD
Estimate
Gross Net
Value Total Value
of All Trading of Al 1
Trades Costs Trades
Ave.
No. of Duration
Trades of a
Made posi tion
Net Profit
or Loss
per trade
EMA5 72737 38239 34498 21 3.6 1643
MAV5 61394 38681 33714 15 2.5 1514
ARMA 70845 40005 30840 21 2.3 1469
LISD 67850 36488 31362 18 2.8 1742
RGN 65175 30047 35128 18 2.5 1952
MEAN 37043 20675 16368 11 9.6 1488
b) 1984
EMA5 4854 (3341) 751 4 9.0 188
MAV5 4079 (1979) 2100 2 5.5 1050
ARMA 6692 (3336) 3356 4 5.0 839
LISD 1380 (1450) -70 2 7.0 -35
RGN 8615 (3793) 4822 4 5.7 1206
MEAN 1140 (1758) -607 2 7.0 -304
*Abbreviations are as follows:
EMA5 = 5-day exponentially-weighted moving average of the ISD's,
MAV5 = 5-day equally-weighted moving average of the ISD's,
ARMA = autoregressive-moving 1 day ahead forecasts of the ISD,
LISD = 1-day lag of ISD's (yesterday's value),
RGN = cross-sectional-time-series regression model 1 day ahead fore-
casts (using an optimal time series predictor of the ISD's from
the ARMA modeling)
,
MEAN = a constant value of the ISD over the entire period equal to an
approximation of the mean ISD value for the near-term, at the
money option in the preceding period.
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Table 8
Average-Absolute and Relative Differences Between Model and Market
Prices - By ISD Estimate and Exercise Price
1983
ISD i June June Sept Sept Sept Sept Sept
Estimate 150 165 145 150 160 165 165
EMA5 *(a) .0280 .1008 .2194 .3418 .2484 .2195 .9351
*(r) -.0069 .0340 -.0454 -.1048 -.0032 -.1065 -.2839
MAV5 (a) .0309 .1080 .2287 .3148 .2804 .3099 .9754
(r) -.0029 .0558 -.0617 -.1059 -.0091 -.1768 -.5563
ARMA (a) .0253 .1242 .2525 .3679 .2850 .1057 .9925
(r) -.0119 .0813 -.1141 .1727 .0127 -.0515 -.0783
LISD (a) .0259 .1089 .2521 .4599 .2449 .1409 1.1601
(r) -.0073 .0155 -.0232 -.0558 -.0011 -.0529 -.1064
RGN (a) .0297 .1176 .2214 .3454 .2490 .1960 .8146
(r) -.0157 .0740 -.0977 .1614 .1106 .1819 -.0490
MEAN (a) .0662 .1152 .5412 .3998 .5783 .6123 -.6328
(r) -.0662 .0959 -.5412 -.3909 -.5783 -.6123 .8589
* a = average absolute difference between the Black 0PM (BP) and actual
market prices (MP), calculated as follows:
N
£ Ibp.-mpJ/n
. , 1 p1=1
r = average relative difference between the Black 0PM and actual
market prices, calculated as follows:
N
£ (BP.-MP.)/N
1 = 1
1
*
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Table 9
Average Absolute and Relative Differences Between Model and Market
Prices - by ISD Estimate and Exercise Price
198A
ISD June June June June Sept Sept Sept
Estimate 150 155 160 165 160 165 170
EMA5 (a) .0821 .0851 .0189 .0028 .1727 .0898 .0407
(r) .0431 .0851 .0189 .0028 .0334 .0131 .0024
MAV5 (a) .1043 .1203 .0272 .0047 .1469 .0775 .0329
(r) .0669 .1203 .0262 .0047 .0269 .0099 -.0031
ARMA (a) .0853 .1318 .0257 .0029 .1761 .0962 .0448
(r) .0715 .1318 .0193 .0029 .1379 .0543 .0181
LISD (a) .0555 .0658 .0219 .0023 .0803 .0490 .0319
(r) .0204 .0556 .0192 .0023 .0058 -.0019 -.0026
RGN (a) .1249 .1670 .1677 .0041 .1417 .0656 .0403
(r) .1248 .1670 .0041 .1279 .0260 -.0038
MEAN (a) .1410 .4130 .0579 .0037 .1024 .0604 .0635
(r) .1410 .4130 .0579 .0037 -.0107 -.0429 -.0635
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